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SECRET CODES, MILITARY HOSPITALS, AND THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT: COULD MILITARY MEDICAL FACILITIES'
USE OF ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONS SUBJECT THEM TO
ATTACK UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW?
Philip R. Principe*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decades of the twentieth century, instantaneous communica-
tion from virtually any point on the planet became commonplace.' The
Interne today is one of the fruits of a communications revolution where
tremendous amounts of information can be shared between people located
anywhere on the globe. All now have instant access to events in real time
wherever they occur.3 People and organizations in the developed world rely
heavily on such communications, even taking them for granted, and the
United States military certainly is no exception. With thousands of person-
nel dispersed all over the globe,4 the United States military has become
. Juris Doctor, cum laude, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law, Washington, D.C.; Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service, cum laude, Georgetown
University, Washington, D.C. Admitted to practice before the courts of the State of Mary-
land, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Virginia, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.
Currently assigned as Area Defense Counsel, Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, Judge
Advocate General's Department, United States Air Force. Formerly assigned to the 314th
Airlift Wing, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas,
1998-2001. This article was inspired by a position paper published by the International and
Operations Law section of the Air Force Judge Advocate General's Department and a re-
sponse authored by the Little Rock Air Force Base Legal Office. This article cites only un-
classified material publicly available to any writer on this subject. The views and conclusions
expressed herein are solely those of the author. They are not intended and should not be
thought to represent official ideas, attitudes, or policies of the United States Air Force, the
Department of Defense, or any agency of the United States Government.
1. Even instantaneous communication from extremely remote, inhospitable areas has
become reality. See John F. Burns, Everest Takes Worst Toll, Refusing to Become Stylish,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1996, at Al (discussing the leader of a climbing expedition who made
a satellite telephone call just below the summit of Mount Everest to his wife in New Zealand
immediately prior to his death).
2. The Internet, distilled to its most basic, is "an international network of intercon-
nected computers." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
3. Although instant access to information can be a force for economic development
and liberty, such real time information dissemination can result in the amplification of dis-
ruptive effects. Nowhere was this more evident than in the attacks on the World Trade Center
in New York City on September 11, 2001. See Felicity Barringer & Geraldine Fabrikant, A
Day of Terror: The Media, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A25 ("It was one of the rare in-
stances when television brought disaster into American homes in real time.").
4. As of March 2001, there were approximately 1.48 million people on active duty in
the United States military. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT ON ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO
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equally dependent on this instantaneous communication through computer
data networks for routine "housekeeping" functions, as well as for warfight-
ing capability. 5 This capability rests on the secure dissemination of informa-
tion, much of it encrypted6 and classified.' As military facilities become
increasingly linked to classified, encrypted computer data networks, ques-
tions arise under international law and the law of armed conflict (LOAC) 8
THE COMMON DEFENSE B-19 (Mar. 2001), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/
alliedcontrib200l/allied2001 .pdf.
5. See WHITE HOUSE, DEFENDING AMERICA'S CYBERSPACE: NATIONAL PLAN FOR
INFORMATION SYSTEMS PROTECTION 82 (version 1.0 2000), available at http://www.ciao.gov/
CIAODocumentLibrary/national_plan%20_final.pdf [hereinafter DEFENDING AMERICA'S
CYBERSPACE] (noting that the Department of Defense uses the Internet for a myriad of its
requirements from travel payments to satellite communications to electronic commerce, as
well as for direct warfighting).
6. Cryptography is the "[a]rt or science concerning the principles, means, and methods
for rendering plain information unintelligible and for restoring encrypted information to
intelligible form." Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/3, Protecting Sensitive Com-
partmented Information Within Information Systems I E (June 5, 1999), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/DCID 6-3 20Policy.htm [hereinafter CIA Directive]. An-
other definition of cryptography is the "[s]cience of encrypting plain data and information
into a form intelligible only to authorized persons who are able to decrypt it." U.S. CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE ASSURANCE OFFICE, PRACTICES FOR SECURING CRITICAL INFORMATION
ASSETS 53 (2000). The process by which that information is made unintelligible is "encryp-
tion." See SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK: THE SCIENCE OF SECRECY FROM ANCIENT EGYPT
TO QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY 6 (1999) ("The aim of cryptography is not to hide the exis-
tence of a message, but rather to hide its meaning, a process known as encryption."). For a
discussion of the ancient roots of encrypted and secret communications, see id. at 3-14. Some
see encrypted, secret communications as a constitutionally protected "ancient liberty." See
generally John A. Fraser, III, The Use of Encrypted, Coded and Secret Communication Is an
"'Ancient Liberty" Protected by the United States Constitution, 2 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2 (1997),
at http://vjolt.student.virginia.edu/graphics/vol2/homeart2.html.
This article will not address the rights of sovereign states to encrypt and hide informa-
tion from other states, nor the legality of states' attempts to obtain such concealed informa-
tion. For a discussion of the legality of the espionage under international norms, see Ingrid
Delupis, Foreign Warships and Immunity for Espionage, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 53, 61-70
(1984); Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 321, 321 (1996); Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and
International Law, 46 A.F. L. REV. 217 (1999).
7. See infra notes 34-61 and accompanying text. This increased dependence on com-
puters and computer networks has opened the United States to new vulnerabilities-the U.S.
military alone has at least 2.1 million computers and 10,000 local area networks. Michael N.
Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First Century War and Its Possible
Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1051, 1063 n.53 (1998)
(citing Thomas E. Ricks, Information-Warfare Defense Is Urged, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1997,
at B2); see also Joginder S. Dhillon & Robert I. Smith, Defensive Information Operations
and Domestic Law: Limitations on Government Investigative Techniques, 50 A.F. L. REV.
135, 143-44 (2001).
8. The law of armed conflict (LOAC) is defined as "[t]hat part of international law that
regulates the conduct of armed hostilities." DEP'T OF DEF., DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND
ASSOCIATED TERMS, Joint Pub. 1-02 (as amended through Dec. 19, 2001), available at
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regarding the legality of transmission and reception of such encrypted data
by military medical facilities.9 If such transmissions do violate LOAC, this
may ultimately subject those facilities to attack and destruction during
armed conflict.
This article begins with an overview of the origins of electronic data
transmission and key concepts underlying computer networks, followed by
a discussion of the Department of Defense's (DOD) information infrastruc-
ture, including networks that transmit classified, encrypted information.
Next, it examines the present status of military medical facilities under
LOAC. It will discuss when and how these medical facilities may lose their
protected status. The article then discusses principles of treaty interpretation
and their application to the question of encrypted communications originat-
ing from or received by these facilities. It then examines, in light of these
principles, whether these facilities' use of DOD classified computer net-
works transmitting encrypted data affects their status under LOAC. The
article concludes that encrypted communications to and from land-based
medical treatment facilities alone are insufficient to compromise their status
under LOAC in its current state. However, the article recommends that ob-
servers from outside the United States government be permitted to verify
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/ [hereinafter DOD DICTIONARY]. LOAC rests on
four basic principles, derived from customary international norms and treaties: "military
necessity" or "military objective" (attacks may be made only against those targets which are
valid military objectives), "humanity" or "unnecessary suffering" (attacks should not employ
arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering); "proportionality"
(anticipated loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained); and "discrimi-
nation" or "distinction" (attacks must distinguish combatants from noncombatants and mili-
tary objectives must be distinguished from protected property or protected places).
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 8-10 (Jeanne M. Meyer & Brian J. Bill eds., 2002). For a
thorough survey of the sources and principles underlying LOAC, as well as international law
in general, see Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in
Space, 48 A.F. L. REV. 1, 28-63 (2000).
9. At least one author has wondered about the transmission of Internet messages from
hospital ships of neutral parties and the effect such messages may have on belligerent parties
if not transmitted "in the clear." See George K. Walker, Information Warfare and Neutrality,
33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1079, 1188 (2000).
What about generally exempt ships, such as hospital ships not aiding an enemy,
that send Internet-based messages that might be construed by a belligerent to be
encrypted messages? Would this raise suspicions, however unfounded, such that
neutral exempt vessel use of Internet-based messages should be banned or re-
stricted? Can system segregation be done with today's technology?
Id.
This article will address the legality of such transmissions from all military medical fa-
cilities under international law. But rather than the perspective of the neutral party, the article
will examine the perspective of co-belligerents and what, if any, response belligerent parties
may take against the opposing side's medical facilities under such a scenario.
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that the networks transmitting data to and from such facilities are used
solely for medical information.
II. ORIGINS OF ELECTRONIC DATA TRANSMISSION AND NETWORKING
The ancestor of modem electronic information networks is the tele-
graph system. Its roots stretch back to 1753 when an anonymous letter pub-
lished in a Scottish magazine described how a message could be sent great
distances by connecting the sender and the receiver with twenty-six cables
(one for each letter of the alphabet) and sending electrical impulses down
wires. 10 Although in limited use prior to 1844,11 Samuel Morse's transmis-
sion between Washington, D.C., and Baltimore, Maryland, helped to dem-
onstrate the practicality of the telegraph 2 and catalyze its rapid spread
across the United States and Europe.' 3 Voice transmission via cable 4 and
eventually radio and television followed, heralding further revolution in
telecommunications.' 5 It was not until the 1960s, however, that the concepts
underlying computer networking were articulated.
16
10. SINGH, supra note 6, at 60-61.
11. For an account of telegraphs prior to Samuel Morse's, see Transatlantic Cable
Communications, The Invention of the Telegraph, at http://collections.ic.gc.ca/cable/ in-
vent.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Telegraph] (discussing a type of telegraph
built in Switzerland as early as 1774). See also SINGH, supra note 6, at 60-61; Invention
Dimension, Samuel F.B. Morse: Morse Code, at http://web.mit.edu/invent/www/inventorsI-
Q/morse.html (last modified Jan. 2000).
12. The advantage to Morse's telegraph was that it used an electromagnet to enhance
the signal "so that upon arriving at the receiver's end it was strong enough to make a series
of short and long marks, dots and dashes, on a piece of paper." SINGH, supra note 6, at 61.
13. "By 1854, there were 23,000 miles of telegraph wire in operation [in the United
States alone]." Telegraph, supra note 11.
14. Invention Dimension, Alexander Graham Bell: The Telephone, at http://web.
mit.edu/invent/www/inventorsA-H/grahambell.html (last modified Sept. 2000). Alexander
Graham Bell placed the world's first telephone call over telegraph wires between two towns
in Ontario, Canada, in 1877. Id.
15. See Jeff Madrik, Economic Scene: Government's Role in the New Economy Is Not a
Cheap or Easy One, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2000, at C2.
16. See Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, at http://www.
isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml (last revised Aug. 4, 2000) [hereinafter Internet]. J.C.R.
Licklider of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology wrote a series of memos in August
1961 envisioning "a globally interconnected set of computers through which everyone could
quickly access data and programs from any site." Id. Many have written extensively on the
growth and development of the computer networks that came to be known as the Internet, so
a review of its history is outside the scope of this article. Instead, this article will emphasize
some fundamental concepts underlying computer networks. For a discussion of the history
and current structure of the Internet as well as emerging threats in information warfare, see
Walker, supra note 9, at 1094-1107.
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A key concept underlying what would become the Internet is that of
"open architecture networking,"'17 i.e., a network that was not designed for
just one application but rather as a general infrastructure on which new ap-
plications could be conceived. 18 "In this approach, the choice of any indi-
vidual network technology was not dictated by a particular network archi-
tecture but rather could be selected freely by a provider and made to inter-
work with the other networks through a meta-level 'Internetworking Archi-
tecture."1 9 Early in the history of the Internet, it became clear that for net-
works with different technologies and architectures to communicate with
one another efficiently, improved data transmission standards and proto-
cols 20 had to be developed.2' To address this issue, Robert E. Kahn and Vin-
ton G. Cerf developed Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
(TCP/IP) in the early 1970s.22
TCP/IP is a two-level program: the first level, TCP, directs the assem-
bly of a message or file into data "packets" that are transmitted individually
over the Internet and received by a TCP layer that reassembles the packets
into the original message.23 The second level, IP, handles the address por-
tion of each packet so that it arrives at the correct destination.24 As the
packets arrive at a gateway,25 a router 26 directs the packets via a switch,
which provides the actual path in and out of a gateway for a given packet.27
Thus, in packet switched communications, a message from one computer to
another is broken up into discrete "packets" of data, each of which carries a
destination label, as well as instructions for where the packets fit in the
overall message.28
17. See Barry M. Leiner et al., The Initial Internetting Concepts, at http://www.isoc.org/
internet/history/brief.shtml#InitialConcepts, in Internet, supra note 16.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. "In information technology a protocol.., is the special set of rules that end points
in a telecommunication connection use when they communicate." Whatis.com, Protocol, at
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,289893,sid9_gci2l2839,00.html (last updated May
22, 2001) [hereinafter Protocol].
21. Leiner et al., supra note 17.
22. Id.
23. Whatis.com, Packet, at http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid7
_gci212736,00.html (last updated Jul. 31, 2001).
24. Id.
25. A "gateway" is an "interface between networks." U.S. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
ASSURANCE OFFICE, supra note 6, at 54.
26. A "router" is "[a] device that connects two networks or network segments and may
use IP to route messages." Id. at 57.
27. Whatis.com, Gateway, at http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,289893,sid9_
gci212176,00.html (last updated Aug. 16, 2001).
28. George Johnson, From Two Small Nodes, a Mighty Web Has Grown, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 1999, at F1.
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This "packet switching" method represents a tremendous technical
shift from the older circuit switched model of data transmission.2 9 For ex-
ample, "in an ordinary telephone system two phones were linked by form-
ing a temporary circuit, a dedicated physical channel through which electri-
fied voices flowed.' '30 Since the message is broken down into many differ-
ent packets, each one could take a different path over the network, and no
matter in what sequences the data packets arrived, they could be assembled
to re-form the original message. 31 There are certain advantages to this
method of data transmission: first, there is no need to dedicate a circuit to a
single transmission, since many data packets can stream down each individ-
ual circuit; second, since messages are broken into small fragments, the data
flow is smoother; third, if a packet is corrupted, one can simply re-send the
packet and not the entire message; fourth, such a network is much less vul-
nerable to failure, since packets may follow alternate routes to arrive at their
destination.3 2 As the standard data transmission protocol, TCP/IP is at the
core of computer networking and is indispensable to the Internet and any
packet switched router network today, including those maintained by the
DOD.33
III. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is the DOD agency
charged with the overall management of the Defense Information Infrastruc-
ture (DII).34 "The DII is the web of communications networks, computers,
software, databases, applications, weapon system interfaces, data, security
services, and other services that meet the information processing and trans-
port needs of DOD users, across the range of military operations. 35 The
Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) is a sub-element of the DII
and is "DOD's consolidated worldwide enterprise level telecommunications
infrastructure that provides the end-to-end information transfer network for
29. "Leonard Kleinrock at MIT published the first paper on packet switching theory in
July 1961 and the first book on the subject in 1964." Barry M. Leiner et al., Origins of the
Internet, at http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief'shtml#Origins, in Internet, supra note
16.
30. Johnson, supra note 28, at Ft.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Katie Hafner, For 'Father of the Internet,' New Goals, Same Energy, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 1994, at 4.
34. Defense Information Systems Agency, DISA Mission and Mandate, at
http://www.disa.mil/main/missman.html (last revised Oct. 1, 2001).
35. DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY, DEFENSE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
MASTER PLAN § 2.2 (version 7.0 Mar. 13, 1998), available at http://www.disa.mil/
diimp/diimp-2.html [hereinafter INFRASTRUCTURE].
[Vol. 24
ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONS
supporting military operations. 36 The DISN is, in turn, composed of several
sub-networks, employing primarily IP and Asynchronous Transfer Mode
37
technology. 38 The Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) and
the Non-Classified but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network (NI-
PRNet) are IP subsets of the DISN.3 9
Taken together, these two data networks provide the essential informa-
tion necessary to conduct and support the full range of military opera-
tions, and [to] support [United States] warfighters, the Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commanders-in-Chief,
the Military Services, the Defense Agencies, and other Federal Agen-
cies.
4 0
The SIPRNet is a secret-level 4 1 packet switch network that uses Inter-
net protocol routers and high-capacity DISN circuitry to route data.42 It is a
36. Defense Information Systems Agency, DISN Architecture: Defense Information
Infrastructure § 1.3, at http://www.disa.mil/DISN/disnarl.htg/disnarl.html (last revision
Mar. 2001).
37. Asynchronous Transfer Mode (or "ATM") is "a dedicated-connection switching
technology that organizes digital data into 53-byte cell units and transmits them over a physi-
cal medium using digital signal technology." Whatis.com, ATM, at http://searchnetworking.
techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid7_gci213790,00.html (last updated Aug. 16, 2001).
38. DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY, DISA CIRCULAR No. 310-55-9, BASE
LEVEL SUPPORT FOR THE DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS NETWORK (DISN) C. 1.1.1-.2
(Nov. 5, 1999), available at http://www.disa.mil/pubs/circulars/dc310559.pdf.
39. DOD Networks; Government Activity, GOV'T COMPUTER NEWS, Sept. 11, 2000, at
67; see also INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 35, § 2.4.2. The Joint Worldwide Intelligence
Communications System (JWICS) is or soon will be a component of the DISN. See Federa-
tion of American Scientists, Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System [JWICS],
at http://www.fas.org/irp/program/disseminate/jwics.htm (updated Jan. 18, 1999) [hereinafter
JWICS]; see also Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6211.02A, Defense In-
formation System Network and Connected Systems, I.d. (May 22, 1996), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/6211 02a.pdf. JWICS is the router network de-
signed to carry data designated TS/SCI, or Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Informa-
tion. See JWICS, supra. For definitions of information sensitivity level designations used by
the United States Government, see infra note 41.
40. Hearing Before the House Armed Servs. Comm., Subcomm. on Readiness, 107th
Cong. (May 17, 2001) (prepared testimony of Major General James D. Bryan), available at
LEXIS Federal News Service [hereinafter Bryan Testimony].
41. The United States Government generally uses three basic terms to classify the sensi-
tivity of information under its control. The lowest level of classification is termed "confiden-
tial;" the next highest is "secret," followed by "top secret." The classification level of the
information is based on the expected damage to United States national security if there were
an unauthorized disclosure of the data. Information is classified as "secret" when the unau-
thorized revelation of the information would be expected to cause "serious damage" to
United States national security. See Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17,
1995). The additional designation "sensitive compartmented information" means
"[c]lassified information concerning or derived from intelligence sources, methods, or ana-
lytical processes, which is required to be handled within formal access control systems estab-
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worldwide network replacing an older packet-switched network (the De-
fense Secure Network One (DSNET 1) of the Defense Data Network
(DDN)); the initial SIPRNet backbone was activated on March 3, 1994.43
SIPRNet uses TCP/IP protocol service," and subscribers in both the DOD
as well as within other government agencies can use the SIPRNet to transfer
information at the classification level of Secret-Not Releasable to Foreign
Nationals (SECRET-NOFORN).45
The SIPRNet's role is to support national defense command, control,
communications, and intelligence (C31) requirements. 4 It is used as the
underlying transmission infiastructure for the Global Command and Control
System (GCCS)47 and, in the future, will be used for certain portions of the
Global Combat Support System (GCSS). 48 The SIPRNet is also used "for
force projection, for reporting situational awareness, for intelligence pur-
poses, to distribute Air Tasking Orders, for support of drug enforcement
operations and for nuclear assurance." 49 As of May 2001, the SIPRNet
lished by the Director of Central Intelligence." CIA Directive, supra note 6.
42. DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 8 (defining "Secret Internet Protocol Router Net-
work").
43. Federation of American Scientists, Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
(SIPRNET), at http://www.fas.org/irp/program/disseminate/sipmet.htm (updated Mar. 3,
2000) [hereinafter FAS, SIPRNET]. Prior to 1994, DOD data transmission networks were
organized as follows: Military Network (MILNET) for unclassified traffic; DSNET 1 for
secret traffic; DSNET 2 for top secret traffic; and DSNET 3 for TS/SCI. Evolution of Data
Services-Corrected Version, DEF. DATA NETWORK NEWSL. (DDN Network Info. Ctr.), Nov.
3, 1994, at 1, available at http://www.nic.mil/ftp/mgt/news9409.txt.
44. The SIPRNet also supports File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Telnet, Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTIP) and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). Defense Information Systems
Agency, Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), at http://www.inmspac.
disa.mil/sipmet.html (last revised Jan. 30, 2001) [hereinafter DISA, SIPRNET].
45. FAS, SIPRNET, supra note 43.
46. Id.
47. Defense Information Systems Agency, Global Command & Control System (GCCS)
Overview, at http://gccs.disa.mil/gccs/overview.html (last modified June 19, 2000). The
GCCS is
the Department of Defense's computerized system of record for strategic com-
mand and control functions . . . . GCCS provides combatant commanders one
predominant source for generating, receiving, sharing and using information se-
curely. It provides surveillance and reconnaissance information and access to
global intelligence sources as well as data on the precise location of dispersed
friendly forces.
Id.
48. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CAPSTONE REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT: GLOBAL COMBAT
SUPPORT SYSTEM 7 (June 5, 2000), available at http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/4/projects/gcss/
crdjrocflag.doc. The GCSS is the DOD logistics network, and supports the GCCS. See De-
fense Information Systems Agency, GCSS Executive Summary, at http://www.disa.mil/gcss/
execsum.html (updated Aug. 13, 2001).
49. Bryan Testimony, supra note 40, 1 8. An air tasking order is a "method used to task
and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies pro-
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served approximately 125,000 personnel over 901 post, camp and station
connections, and since 1996, there has been a 200% increase in customers
and over 600% in traffic. 50 According to Major General James D. Bryan, the
SIPRNet "has become the most critical data system supporting the war-
fighter today."5'
The security and integrity of this network are of great concern for the
United States military, and the network is constantly monitored. 52 There-
fore, the SIPRNet is separated both physically and logically from other
computer networks.53 In fact, all SIPRNet nodes54 are "housed in United
States Military facilities protected to the Secret level."'55
jected sorties, capabilities and/or forces to targets and specific missions. Normally provides
specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as gen-
eral instructions." DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 8.
50. Bryan Testimony, supra note 40, 8.
51. Id.; see also F. WHITTEN PETERS, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE,
available at http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr2000/af.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2002). For
specific examples of the SIPRNet's effects on United States military operations around the
globe, see Hearing Before the House Armed Servs. Comm., Subcomms. on Military Readi-
ness and Research and Development, 106th Cong. (Mar. 8, 2000), available at LEXIS Fed-
eral News Service (noting that "during Operation Allied Force in Serbia and Kosovo, the
SIPRNet ... literally replaced regular naval messages as the primary means for communica-
tion and coordination among our staffs and ships").
52. Security on both the NIPRNet and the SIPRNet is maintained by DISA's Global
Network Operations & Security Center, which is manned twenty-four hours a day, seven
days a week. Defense Information Systems Agency, Fact Sheet: Global Network Operations
and Security Center (GNOSC) Command Center, at http://www.disa.millinfo/fsgnosc.html
(last revision June 14, 2000).
53. DISA, SIPRNET, supra note 44; see also George I. Seffers, Fit to Fight the Info
War? Critics Say Proposed Test of DOD IT Networks Is Unrealistic, FED. COMPUTER WK.
(Mar. 12, 2001), at http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2001/0312/news-iwar-03-12-01.asp.
Seffers quoted a joint statement from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and DISA high-
lighting the security of SIPRNet:
The SIPRNET is a closed system; the Internet is not. The SIPRNET uses pro-
tected distribution systems; the Internet does not. Information flowing on the
SIPRNET is encrypted; most on the Internet is not. Users on the SIPRNET must
be vouchsafed on to the network; users on the Internet need not be.
Some see physical separation between the SIPRNet and other networks as a key to its secu-
rity. See Campbell: Keep SIPRNet Separate from NIPRNet, Gov'T COMPUTER NEWS, July
24, 2000, at 50. However, the separation between the SIPRNet and other networks may be
blurred. See Bill Murray, US. Peacekeepers Use Net to Access Classified Network, GOV'T
COMPUTER NEWS, May 15, 2000, at 40 (noting that United States peacekeepers in East Timor
arranged for access to the SIPRNet through the Internet); News Release, United States Navy,
SPAWAR Information Security Group Scores a First (Mar. 13, 2001), available at
http://enterprise.spawar.navy.mil/spawarpublicsite/docs/nr-2001-013.pdf (noting success in
using bridge method via "Trusted Guard" system to transmit sensitive unclassified personnel
data to the Global Command and Control System located on the SIPRNet).
54. A node is a redistribution point or end point for data transmission, and, in general, a
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Due to this physical separation from public data networks, hacking into
the SIPRNet from a computer not already vouched onto the network would
appear to be virtually impossible; thus the SIPRNet has apparently never
been compromised by external intruders. 6 A more likely scenario than ex-
ternal hacking is that of authorized users themselves compromising the
SIPRNet's security,57 especially in light of its large number of users.58 Nev-
ertheless, one can imagine a situation where interception and decryption of
the data in transit may be possible, either by tapping into the transmission
cables or network nodes, or by installing covert access points surrepti-
tiously.59 However, given the technical and logistical difficulties of such
endeavors, this type of network breach would require significant re-
sources.
60
Moreover,
[A]II SIPRNet-connected systems must first go through certification to
determine that they are secure .... All links between SIPRNet hosts are
encrypted. Not only is the data encrypted at the host level, but any cir-
node has the capability to recognize and process or forward data to other nodes. Whatis.com,
Node, at http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,289893,sid9_gci2l2665,00.html (last up-
dated Nov. 23, 1999).
55. Bryan Testimony, supra note 40,19.
56. Heather Harreld & Bob Brewin, Pentagon Denies Hacker Penetrated Secret Nets,
FED. COMPUTER WK. (Apr. 27, 1998), at http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/1998/FCW_
042798_380.asp.
57. This may have already happened. See James W. Crawley, Navy Officer Is Subject of
Security Probe, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 23, 2000, at B-3:7 (reporting that a naval
officer's personal computing equipment was seized by federal agents after he stated that he
had downloaded classified information from SIPRNet onto various computer disks).
58. See supra text accompanying note 50. In fact, the large number of users has been an
ongoing source of concern. See Daniel Verton, DOD Taking Steps to Secure Secret Network
Further, FED. COMPUTER WK. (May 5, 1999), at http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/1999/
fcw_551999 pki.asp ("Looking to protect its classified information network from internal
security threats, the Defense Department is considering a new policy that will limit strictly
network users' access to information.").
59. Such endeavors are by no means unprecedented. See Lawrence D. Sloan, Echelon
and the Legal Restraints on Signals Intelligence: A Need for Reevaluation, 50 DUKE L.J.
1467, 1477 n.46 (2001) (citing SHERRY SONTAG & CHRISTOPHER DREW, BLIND MAN'S
BLUFF: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICAN SUBMARINE ESPIONAGE 171-72 (1998), which
describes the submarine USS Halibut's successful mission to tap into an undersea Soviet
military communications line in October 1971).
60. Nevertheless, this may have occurred. See Bill Gertz & Rowan Scarborough, Inside
the Ring, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2001, at A10 (stating that federal officials were investigat-
ing whether FBI agent Robert P. Hanssen, accused of spying for Russia, may have aided
Russian intelligence in placing secret access points on the SIPRNet allowing covert access to
the network).
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cuits linking a classified host to a SIPRNet router are encrypted, as are
router-to-router links across the DISN wide area network.
61
Granting access to the SIPRNet to most, if not all, military units ap-
pears increasingly likely, given its expanding role and indeed that of en-
crypted communications in general for military operations. Encryption,
however, is not limited to the SIPRNet, or even to classified networks. The
use of encryption for all DOD electronic communications may come to pass
in the near future. According to a White House report, by October of 2001,
the encryption of all e-mail throughout the DOD should be encouraged, and
no separate policy was noted for medical facilities. 62
For example, the Theater Medical Information Program (TMIP) is a
joint-services information system whose
primary purpose is to integrate/develop medical information systems to
capture the medical record and link all theater levels of care in an inte-
grated, interoperatable fashion to provide enhanced medical care to the
warfighter. TMIP's software will be used on the [GCCS/GCSS] back-
bone and Service computer/communications infrastructure allowing the
warfighter to monitor and maintain Theater medical situational aware-
63
ness.
Even beyond any encryption solely incidental to TMIP's use of the
GCCS/GCSS as part of the SIPRNet, TMIP will specifically encrypt elec-
tronic transmissions of patient medical information."
Such transmission of encrypted data by military medical facilities
raises legal questions under international law. If these transmissions violate
LOAC, this may render such facilities lawful military targets under certain
conditions. To determine under what, if any, circumstances such transmis-
sions may violate international law of armed conflict, an examination of the
protections accorded military medical facilities and their limitations is nec-
essary.
61. William Dutcher, NIPRnet Keeps Secrets, Too, Gov'T COMPUTER NEWS, Aug. 26,
1996, at 59.
62. DEFENDING AMERICA'S CYBERSPACE, supra note 5, at 94.
63. Theater Medical Information Program, at http://tmip.hirs.osd.mil (last visited Mar.
4, 2002).
64. CAPSTONE REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT FOR THE THEATER MEDICAL INFORMATION
PROGRAM para. 4.4.2 (Feb. 25, 1999), available at http://tmip.hirs.osd.mil/Mission/CRD
_vl.pdf [hereinafter TMIP CAPSTONE REQUIREMENTS] ("Appropriate encryption devices will
be used to protect the electronic transfer of patient medical information between major in-
formation transfer points.").
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IV. PROTECTIONS FOR MEDICAL FACILITIES IN ARMED CONFLICT
Since antiquity, norms of warfare have included the idea that certain
places and properties should not be subject to attack and destruction. 65
Medical facilities on land, sea, and (in the twentieth century) in the air are
part of this traditional protected sphere. The protection of fixed as well as
mobile medical facilities and units is recognized in Article 19 of the Geneva
Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, which states that "[flixed establishments
and mobile medical units of the Medical Service may in no circumstances
be attacked, but shall at all times be respected and protected by the Parties
to the conflict."66 Medical aircraft are also protected from attack. 67 Protec-
tion for medical ships is contained in Article 22 of the Geneva Convention
II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, which states that such ships, "built or
equipped by the Powers specially and solely with a view to assisting the
wounded, sick and shipwrecked, to treating them and to transporting them,
may in no circumstances be attacked. ' '68 The protection covers the sick-bay
areas on warships, as well as shore support establishments protected under
Geneva Convention 1.69
These protections may be lost if these facilities are used to commit
acts-outside their humanitarian duties-which are "harmful to the en-
emy.'' 70 Even in such instances, protection may only cease after due warn-
ing has been given, naming, in all appropriate cases, a reasonable time for
65. For a survey of the roots of this idea in Western thought from ancient Greece
through the twentieth century, see Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Legal Regime for Protecting
Cultural Property During Armed Conflict, 42 A.F. L. REV. 277, 281-97 (1997); see also
DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANTIQUITY 249-55 (2001) (discussing the
protection of sacred places and persons from effects of combat). There are a number of "Ge-
neva Conventions" on the laws of war, dating from 1864. See International Committee of the
Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law: Answers to Your Questions, Questions 2-3,
available at http://www.icrc.org. This article will focus on two of the Geneva Conventions
following World War II that deal with protections accorded to the wounded and sick on land
and at sea. See infra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
66. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 19, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention I].
67. Id. at art. 36. The term "medical aircraft" means "aircraft exclusively employed for
the removal of wounded and sick and for the transport of medical personnel and equipment
." Id.
68. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 22, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II].
69. Id. at arts. 23, 28.
70. Geneva Convention I, supra note 66, art. 21; Geneva Convention II, supra note 68
art. 34; see infra text accompanying note 72.
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compliance, and after such warning has been unheeded.71 Although the Ge-
neva Conventions do not specifically define "acts harmful to the enemy,"
the International Committee of the Red Cross interprets these acts to mean
"acts the purpose or effect of which is to harm the adverse Party, by facili-
tating or impeding military operations."
72
The language in both Geneva Conventions regarding acts "outside their
humanitarian duties" is crucial, since "it is possible for humane acts to be
harmful to the enemy, or for [them] to be wrongly interpreted as so being by
an enemy lacking in generosity. ' ,73 Hypothetical examples of actions that,
although possibly harmful to the enemy, are still within medical facilities'
humanitarian duties include interference with tactical enemy operations
solely by virtue of their mere presence (i.e., the effect of their lights at night
on targeting) and electromagnetic interference with enemy transmissions
stemming from the use of medical equipment.74
The commentaries to these Geneva Conventions also provide examples
of acts that render medical units subject to warning and attack. These in-
clude, in the case of medical ships, "carrying combatants or arms, transmit-
ting military information by radio, or deliberately providing cover for a
warship, 75 and in the case of mobile or fixed medical units include "the use
of a hospital as a shelter for able-bodied combatants or fugitives, as an arms
or ammunition dump, or as a military observation post; [or] ... the deliber-
ate siting of a medical unit in a position where it would impede an enemy
attack."76
71. Geneva Convention I, supra note 66, art. 21; Geneva Convention II, supra note 68,
art. 34.
72. International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentaries to Geneva Convention I
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,
art. 21, at 200 (Aug. 12, 1949), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebComART
?OpenView [hereinafter Commentaries to Geneva Convention 1]; International Committee of
the Red Cross, Commentaries to Geneva Convention H for the Amelioration of the Condition
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 34, at 190-91
(Aug. 12, 1949), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebComART?OpenView [herein-
after Commentaries to Geneva Convention II].
73. Commentaries to Geneva Convention I, supra note 72, art. 21, at 201; see also
Commentaries to Geneva Convention II, supra note 72, art. 34, at 191. In fact, without this
language, an adverse party could theoretically argue that medical treatment of the opposing
side's own forces constitutes a harmful act, since the obvious goal of medical treatment is to
render a wounded soldier capable of fighting once more.
74. Commentaries to Geneva Convention I, supra note 72, art. 21, at 201; see also
Commentaries to Geneva Convention II, supra note 72, art. 34, at 191.
75. Commentaries to Geneva Convention II, supra note 72, art. 34, at 191.
76. Commentaries to Geneva Convention I, supra note 72, art. 21, at 200-01.
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V. TREATY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGALITY OF ENCRYPTED
TRANSMISSIONS FROM MILITARY MEDICAL FACILITIES
It is significant that although there is a direct prohibition on the posses-
sion or use of a "secret code" by medical ships in Geneva Convention II,
77
there is no such restriction on fixed or mobile land-based medical facilities
in Geneva Convention I. In order to cultivate an informed discussion of
meaning and effect of the lack of such a clause, a brief review of treaty in-
terpretation principles is necessary. 78 The methods of treaty interpretation
used by United States courts generally rest on three canons: begin interpre-
tation with the treaty's text, construe treaties liberally and in good faith, and
effectuate the intent of the parties.79 When commencing an analysis of lan-
guage in international agreements, United States courts are most often
guided by principles of statutory and contract interpretation.80 The starting
77. Geneva Convention II, supra note 68, art. 34. The commentaries to Article 34 state:
The fact that the use of any secret code is prohibited affords a guarantee to the
belligerents that hospital ships will not make improper use of their transmitting
apparatus or any other means of communication. Hospital ships may only com-
municate in clear, or at least in a code which is universally known, and rightly
so, for the spirit of the Geneva Conventions requires that there should be nothing
secret in their behaviour vis-i-vis the enemy.
Commentaries to Geneva Convention II, art. 34, supra note 72, at 193. Interestingly, "the
equally authentic Spanish and French texts of this article prohibit only the sending.., of
encrypted traffic." J. Ashley Roach, The Hague Peace Conferences: The Law of Naval War-
fare at the Turn of Two Centuries, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 75 (2000).
78. This analysis begins with treaty interpretation from the standpoint of American
jurisprudence before looking to international law.
79. David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REv.
953, 964-70 (1994). The search for basic principles of treaty interpretation is no small task
"because a court's selection of an interpretative method for construing any legal instrument
(whether a contract, statute, or treaty) is often driven by the substantive result desired." Id. at
956. Moreover, United States courts "frequently apply different substantive canons of con-
struction to different kinds of treaties," depending on whether the treaty is characterized as
contractual, legislative, or "something altogether sui generis." Id. at 963. The basic philoso-
phies of treaty interpretation are the "textual approach," emphasizing the "plain and natural
meaning" of the treaty text; the "limited contextual approach," which puts primacy on the
treaty text, but is willing to look at extrinsic materials; and the "policy oriented and configu-
rative" approach, which looks to effectuate the intentions of the parties wherever those may
be found, both within the treaty text and outside it. BuRNs H. WESTON, RICHARD A. FALK, &
ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 59-62 (2d ed. 1990).
80. Iceland S.S. Co. v. United States Dep't of the Army, 201 F.3d 451, 458 (D.C. Cir.
2000); see, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 720 (1893) ("A treaty, it is
true, is in its nature a contract between nations .... ); The Chinese Exclusion Cases, 130
U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (same); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) ("A treaty is
primarily a compact between independent nations."). Whether the emphasis is on contractual
or statutory interpretation principles depends on whether the treaty has the flavor of legisla-
tion or contract. Bederman, supra note 79, at 963. For a discussion of the limits to the con-
tract analogy and consideration of whether law and economics contractual analysis can be
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point for interpretation of any treaty is the language of the treaty itself.8'
The plain language of the treaty is controlling unless "application of the
words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result in-
consistent with the intent or expectations of its signatories. 8 2 These princi-
ples are generally consistent with international norms regarding treaty inter-
pretation.8
3
Closely related to the idea of plain language as primary interpretive
device is the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Simply put, this
axiom states that "where a form of conduct, the manner of its performance
and operation, and the persons and things to which it refers are designated,
there is an inference that all omissions should be understood as exclu-
sions.,8 4 It, too, is applicable to treaty interpretation and is particularly illu-
minating in this context.8 5 This axiom is not only an interpretive tool, it is
also a basic rule of logic86 and has been utilized for centuries.8 7
applied to treaties in a meaningful way, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Eco-
nomic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L LAW 1, 29-50 (1999).
81. Iceland S.S. Co., 201 F.3d. at 458 (citing Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano,
457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982)). Although this may be an obvious starting point for treaty
interpretation, the Supreme Court has "[an] unfortunate tendency to deviate from the text
... despite [its] pronouncements that if a treaty's language is clear, no other means of
interpretation may be employed." Bederman, supra note 79, at 965.
82. Bederman, supra note 79, at 966 (quoting Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49,
54 (1963)). This is a longstanding principle of treaty interpretation under United States law:
But this intention [of the Parties to a treaty] is to be collected from the language
they have used; if that be clear and plain, there is no room for interpretation; but,
if ambiguous in itself, then the intention may be fairly collected from the object
and circumstances of the stipulation in question. In a word, the treaty is to be
executed as it is, and no new treaty to be made by the labour of exposition.
The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 51 (1821). But see Bederman, supra note 79, at
965 (noting the Supreme Court's tendency to deviate even from the clear language of the
treaty text).
83. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 325 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 287, at 365 (Richard Henry Dana, Jr., ed., 8th ed. 1866) ("Public
treaties are to be interpreted like other laws and contracts."). However, United States courts
have been less than consistent in the application of these principles. See Bederman, supra
note 79, at 964. Some have noted that this "contract law" theory has its limitations because of
structural differences between international and domestic law. See Detlev F. Vagts, The
United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 313, 325 (2001)
("In domestic law the explanation for a contract's binding character is not to be found in the
simple fact that the contract has been made but in the law of contracts.").
84. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:23 (6th ed.
2000 rev.); see also id. § 47:25 ("The maxim emphasizes the language of the statute and the
inferences to be drawn from the way it is written. There is generally an inference that omis-
sions are intentional.").
85. LORD ARNOLD DUNCAN MCNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES 400 (1961). As Lord McNair
succinctly states, "[the maxim expressio unius exclusio alterius] would find a place in the
logic of the nursery. If I agree that my brother may play with my railway engine and my
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The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides additional
guidance on treaty interpretation.88 Although not in existence at the time
Geneva Conventions I and II were drafted,89 the Vienna Convention never-
theless does codify "some of the customary rules governing the interpreta-
tion of international treaties." 90 Its hierarchy of principles is contained in
Articles 31 through 33. The basic principle is contained in Article 31(1),
which states that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their con-
motor car, it is obvious that I have not given him permission to play with my model aero-
plane." Id. at 399-400. This maxim is also expressed as "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius,"
"expressum facit cessare tacitum," "affermatio est exclusio alterius," and "a contrario." Id. at
401-02.
86. Id. at 402 (citation omitted) ("The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a
rule of both law and logic and applicable to the construction of treaties as well as municipal
statutes and contracts."). But see Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 611-12 (1927) (noting
that this maxim requires caution in its application); MYREs S. McDOUGAL, HAROLD D.
LASSWELL, & JAMES C. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: PRINCIPLES OF CONTEXT AND PROCEDURE 330-43 (1967) (critiquing the idea that
"expressio unius" truly represents a rule of logic).
87. See McNAIR, supra note 85, at 402-10 (discussing application of this concept in
treaty interpretation in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries). In fact, the Ro-
mans employed this principle, although perhaps not expressed in the formula "expressio
unius," to great effect: in a treaty between Rome and the Aetolians in 197 B.C., accom-
plished with the objective of breaking Macedonia's power, "it was provided that all the mov-
able property taken as booty should go to the Romans, the lands and conquered towns to the
Aetolians." I COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT
GREECE AND ROME 407-08 (1911). Philip of Macedonia was defeated in Thessaly by Titus
Quinticus and the Macedonian ambassadors sued for peace. Id. at 416. After Philip's defeat,
the Aetolians claimed the Thessalian cities in accordance with what they believed were the
terms of their treaty. Id. at 408. Quinticus, however, argued that the clause on which this
claim was based "spoke only of captured cities-whereas the states of Thessaly had surren-
dered of their own free will." Id.; see also BEDERMAN, supra note 65, at 198.
88. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
89. The Vienna Convention is specifically not retroactive and therefore does not directly
govern interpretation of Geneva Conventions I and II. Id. at art. 4. Nevertheless, the Vienna
Convention's provisions represent evidence of customary international law principles of
treaty interpretation, and as such, would influence interpretive methods applied to the Ge-
neva Conventions I and II. See generally Jonathan F. Chamey, International Agreements and
the Development of Customary International Law, 61 WASH. L. REv. 971, 975-76 (1986)
(noting that Vienna Convention dominates law on international agreements).
90. Angela M. Bradley, Opposing Interpretations of an International Treaty: The Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty Controversy, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 295, 297 (2001); see also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 83, § 325 n.4. Although the United States has not ratified the
Vienna Convention, "[m]any commentators believe that the Convention's terms are nonethe-
less fully binding on the United States as customary international law." Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REv.
399, 424 (2000).
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text and in the light of its object and purpose."9' The context of a treaty in-
cludes "any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all
the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty" 92 as well as "any
instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty." 93 The Vienna Convention focuses on the text of inter-
national agreements; "[r]esort to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent...
is meant to be only an exceptional occurrence" 94 when provisions are am-
biguous or obscure or "interpretation according to Article 31 leads to a re-
sult which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." 95
Applying these principles to the Geneva Conventions I and II, it is
clear that the plain text of Geneva Convention I contains no prohibition on
land-based medical facilities using "secret codes." There is nothing am-
biguous about the lack of such a provision in and of itself.96 Under the
above articulated rules, there is no need to look outside the text of Geneva
Convention I since it does not meet the threshold for textual ambiguity.
97
However, given the fact that these conventions were signed simultaneously
91. Vienna Convention, supra note 88, art. 31(1).
92. Id. at art. 31(2)(a).
93. Id. at art. 3 l(2)(b). Subsequent agreement of the parties regarding interpretation of
treaty provisions, subsequent practice of the parties, and any relevant rules of international
law are also taken into account, together with the context. Id. at art. 31(3). Supplementary
means on interpretation, such as preparatory work of the treaty, are used to confirm the
meaning "resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to Article 31 (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b)
leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." Id. at art. 32.
94. Bederman, supra note 79, at 973.
95. Vienna Convention, supra note 88, art. 32(b). Although United States courts have
historically looked outside treaty text to determine the intent of the parties much more readily
than permitted by the Vienna Convention, "[r]ecently, federal courts have become reluctant
to deviate from the text of a treaty unless failing to do so 'leaves the meaning ambiguous or
obscure; or ... [l]eads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable."' Bederman,
supra note 79, at 973-74. The problem has been that the United States Supreme Court has
been unwilling to articulate exactly what kind of vagueness would qualify the terms of an
international agreement as vague enough to warrant departure from the text itself. Id. One
situation where courts have looked outside the agreement itself is where language was miss-
ing in one instrument, but present in another related provision or agreement. Id. (citing So-
ciet6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 534-
40 (1987)). The jurisprudence in this area has been muddled, at best. See id. at 980-91 (cri-
tiquing the Supreme Court's failure to provide definitive guidance for when a treaty text is
vague enough to have to resort to extrinsic sources to ascertain meaning). The best response
to this confusion is a coherent set of principles based on the Vienna Convention as well as
American jurisprudence, as proposed by Bederman. See id. at 1030-34.
96. This author favors a modified version of the limited contextual approach as articu-
lated in the Vienna Convention and expounded on by Bederman. See supra notes 79-95 and
accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 79-95 and accompanying text.
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and given their common subject matter, even the most ardent textualist
would countenance reading these conventions together. When examining
these conventions together, the specific prohibition on medical ships' use
and possession of secret codes, coupled with its absence in Geneva Conven-
tion I, can be seen as demonstrating the treaty drafters' awareness of this
issue. Therefore the omission of a prohibition on the use of "secret codes"
in Geneva Convention I and its corresponding presence in Geneva Conven-
tion II illustrate that there was no intent to prohibit the use of such codes for
any medical facility other than medical ships. 98 Any other interpretation
contradicts the plain language of the conventions themselves, as well as
fundamental maxims of statutory and treaty construction.
99
98. In at least one instance, the Supreme Court found that the omission of certain lan-
guage in one treaty and its presence in another closely related treaty was evidence that such
an omission was not a mere "slip of the pen," but was intentional. Bederman, supra note 79,
at 980 (citing Societ9 Nationale, 482 U.S. at 534-40); see also Western Cherokee Indians ex
rel. Owen v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 981, 984 (Ct. Cl. 1949) ("By no process of liberal
interpretation could a [certain provision], which was not mentioned in the treaty, be incorpo-
rated into the treaty, no matter what may have been the reason for its omission."); The Amia-
ble Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1821) ("This Court does not possess any treaty-
making power .... [T]o alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any clause, whether
small or great, important or trivial, would be on our part an usurpation of power, and not an
exercise of judicial functions."). Of course, under this reading of Geneva Conventions I and
II, the encrypted transmissions stemming from any medical facility covered under Geneva
Convention I is not a treaty violation and is therefore permitted. According to this interpreta-
tion, the TMIP's use of encryption as part of its use of the GCCS/GCSS and the encrypted
transmission of patient medical records could not be a treaty violation so long as the trans-
mission did not emanate from hospital ships covered under Geneva Convention II. See notes
63-64, 77-99 and accompanying text. One may argue that the Geneva Conventions should be
read and interpreted broadly because of their very nature; in fact, some favor a broad inter-
pretative approach "going beyond the intent of the parties to further goals of international
order" when the treaty is sui generis or has a constitutional nature, such as the United Na-
tions Charter. Thomas Michael McDonnell, Defensively Invoking Treaties in American
Courts-Jurisdictional Challenges Under the U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention by US.
Agents, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1401, 1437 n.164 (1996). However "[e]ven those conven-
tions with a legislative or constitutional flavor are fashioned in a contractual sense, fre-
quently with the very selection of words and phrases being the result of unanimous approval
by the signatory States." Bederman, supra note 79, at 1022.
99. See supra notes 77-98 and accompanying text. There are, of course, limitations to
such maxims. See McNAIR, supra note 85, at 400 n.1 ("The exclusio is often the result of
inadvertence or accident, and the maxim ought not to be applied, when its application, hav-
ing regard to the subject matter to which is to be applied, leads to inconsistence or injus-
tice."); 2A SINGER, supra note 84, § 47:25 ("A literal interpretation will prevail if the mean-
ing of the statute is plainly expressed in its language, if it does not involve an absurdity,
contradiction, [or] injustice ...."). In this instance, there is no evidence that interpreting the
lack of a prohibition on coded transmissions from medical facilities in Geneva Convention I
as rendering such transmissions permissible results either in injustice or contradiction. For a
discussion favoring a more expansive method of treaty interpretation, see Michael P. Van
Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 687, 691 (1998) ("[Tlhe [Su-
preme] Court has consistently refused to view a treaty as a body of integrated norms that is
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An alternative view is that a "penumbra" of openness emanating from
the corpus of these conventions dictates that no coded transmissions from
military medical facilities of any kind may be sent.'00 Therefore any such
transmissions would, in fact, constitute a technical breach.' 0 ' Even so, par-
ties to Geneva Conventions I and II must still determine whether such a
breach would constitute an act harmful to the enemy, outside medical facili-
ties' humanitarian duties, prior to any medical facility's loss of protec-
tion.10 2 Under this interpretation, a determination as to whether the encryp-
tion of data within TMIP functions constitutes harmful acts outside medical
facilities' humanitarian duties becomes paramount.'
0 3
As noted above, the TMIP's function is to "support all echelons of care
through an aggregation of medical data and situation reports that serve the
theater of operations as well as the Continental United States (CONUS)
sustaining base medical missions.' 1°4 It will provide United States forces
with medical data concerning "[Command and Control] (including medical
capabilities assessment/sustainability analysis and medical intelligence);
Medical Logistics (MedLog) (including blood and blood product manage-
ment); Patient Movement (PM); Health Care Delivery (HCD) (including
medical surveillance and medical threat); and Manpower, Personnel, Train-
ing, and Resources."' 1 5 The information which is maintained, processed,
capable of generating internal solutions for gaps in its provisions.").
100. For a discussion of the legal theories supporting penumbral obligations under trea-
ties, see Vagts, supra note 83, at 323-30. The idea of penumbral rights and obligations is not
alien to American jurisprudence. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484
(1964) (noting that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance").
101. This assumption contradicts the "plain language" of Geneva Conventions I and II.
See supra notes 77-99 and accompanying text. Such an interpretation would also mean that
that any encrypted transmission from a military medical facility violates Geneva Convention
I, even if it is an encrypted personal e-mail or the purchase of a commercial item over the
Internet via a browser with 128-bit encryption.
102. Of course, a warning must still be given before any aggressive action could be
taken. See supra Part IV.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64 for a discussion of the mission of the
TMIP.
104. TMIP CAPSTONE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 64, para. 1.1.
105. Id. at para. 1.4. The term "command and control" and "medical threat and intelli-
gence" may appear to represent information which may fall outside the humanitarian duties
of medical facilities. "Command and control" means the "capability to receive, process,
display, and analyze situation information to assist commanders in the decision making proc-
ess." Id. at para. 4.2.1. "Medical threat and intelligence" means "[the body of information
and processes used for force medical protection; combat stress control; casualty rate estima-
tion; enemy force strength, location, organization, and weaponry estimates; environmental
and epidemiological studies; foreign military and civilian health care facilities and capabili-
ties; and monitoring." Id. at app. D-1. Such information can be used, inter alia, to estimate
the amount of medical supplies that may be required, the types of injuries and number casu-
alties expected based on the weapons being utilized, as well as to determine whether a medi-
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and disseminated through the TMIP is required for the operation of any
large medical facility. 0 6 Since these types of information processing are
necessary for any large medical institution, such functions fall squarely
within medical humanitarian duties. Therefore, military medical facilities
utilizing the TMIP should be not subject to the loss of their protections un-
der Geneva Convention 1.107
VI. TRENDS IN ENCRYPTION
We have seen the increasing diffusion of encryption throughout the
United States military.1 8 Moreover, powerful encryption software is readily
available,' 0 9 and overall demand for encryption has been on the rise." ° The
cal facility should be evacuated in light of enemy troop location and movements. Based on
these definitions and the medical uses for this information, all such data relates squarely to
the functions of a military medical facility and not to the types of acts which are "harmful to
the enemy." See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
106. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 451,
463-72 (1995) (discussing health care information contained and collected by public and
private health database organizations).
107. Although medical facilities may not lose their protections, one must be mindful of
the distinction between the medical facility itself and TMIP transmission infrastructure ac-
cording to the principle of discrimination. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 8,
at 10 (discussing principle of discrimination or distinction, which requires "that combatants
be distinguished from noncombatants, and that military objectives be distinguished from
protected property or protected places"). However, under this principle, it is this author's
opinion that the TMIP's underlying transmission infrastructure itself (which is the SIPRNet,
at least for part of its information flow) is a lawful target, despite any incidental effect its
disruption may have on medical data flow. With the United States's dependence on informa-
tion superiority in modem conflict, an effective attack on military information networks
could be devastating. See generally Dhillon & Smith, supra note 7; Schmitt, supra note 7;
Walker, supra note 9. The DOD acknowledges TMIP could be a target. See TMIP CAPSTONE
REQUIREMENTS, supra note 64, para. 2.2.
108. See supra notes 46-64 and accompanying text.
109. According to one author,
any user of a personal computer can, barring regulation, download a common
program called Pretty Good Privacy, or PGP, from the Internet at no charge for
personal use. Some academic authors estimate the time needed to crack codes
comparable to those used in PGP is upwards of eight trillion times the history of
the universe.
Geoffrey Gordon, Breaking The Code: What Encryption Means for the First Amendment and
Human Rights, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 477, 481 (2001). For a variety of reasons, the
United States government has been wary of the diffusion of encryption technology, espe-
cially abroad. See generally Joe Baladi, Building Castles Made of Glass--Security on the
Internet, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 251 (1999); Gordon, supra, at 486-87.
110. F. Lynn McNulty, Encryption's Importance to Economic and Infrastructure Secu-
rity, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 427, 428 (1999) ("In general, interest in encryption is at an
all-time high and demand for it in the commercial marketplace is soaring."). However, it
remains to be seen what, if any, effects the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the
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increasing diffusion of encryption technology militates against extending
the bar on encrypted transmissions from medical ships to all military medi-
cal facilities. This is demonstrated by the positions of some Western nations
regarding encryption equipment on medical transport aircraft, as well as
scholarly opinions on the state of the customary law of the sea.
For example, as encryption technology has become commonplace and
transparent to the user, even the direct prohibition on medical ships' use of
"secret codes" is viewed as outdated. Due to technological changes since
1949, "all messages to and from warships, including unclassified messages,
are now automatically encrypted when sent and decrypted when received by
communications equipment that includes the crypto function.""'
In response to these changes, the San Remo Manual on International
Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea recommends that "[i]n order to
fulfill most effectively their humanitarian mission, hospital ships should be
permitted to use cryptographic equipment. The equipment shall not be used
in any circumstances to transmit intelligence data nor in any other way to
acquire any military advantage."'"1 2 According to Louise Doswald-Beck,
"[t]his recommendation was agreed to because of evidence that the prohibi-
tion of the use of a secret code adversely affects the ability of hospital ships
to carry out their mission effectively."' '3 Any misuse of this equipment
"could be minimized by permitting a qualified neutral observer to be on
board to check on the proper use of this equipment.
' 14
An additional example of this evolving view on encrypted data trans-
mission is represented by some Western nations' interpretation of Article
28(2) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts ("Protocol I").' Article 28(2) states that "[m]edical aircraft shall
United States will have on encryption technology. See Mike Godwin, Just Say No-Will
Strong Encryption Be a Casualty of War?, AM. LAW., Nov. 2001, at 73; John Schwartz, As
Debate on Privacy Heats Up. Sales Don't, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2001, at G9.
111. Roach, supra note 77, at 75.
112. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT
SEA para. 171 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO MANUAL]. The SAN
REMO MANUAL was completed in 1994 and represents the labor of scholars and naval practi-
tioners whose desire was to update and clarify the customary international law of armed
conflict at sea in light of new technology and modem means of warfare, and to implement
changes in the law on armed conflict on land and in other areas of international law. Louise
Doswald-Beck, The San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts
at Sea, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 192, 192-94 (1995).
113. Doswald-Beck, supra note 112, at 196. The SAN REMO MANUAL makes this
recommendation despite its direct contradiction with Article 34 of Geneva Convention II.
See Geneva Convention II, art. 34, supra note 68.
114. Roach, supra note 77, at 76 (citing Geneva Convention II, art. 31(4)).
115. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, art. 28(2), 1125
2002]
UALR LAW REVIEW
not be used to collect or transmit intelligence data and shall not carry any
equipment intended for such purposes. 11 6 France, the United Kingdom, and
Ireland, in ratifying Protocol I, all provided an interpretive declaration re-
garding Article 28(2). Each of these nations interprets this article as permit-
ting use of encryption equipment to facilitate navigation, identification, and
communications in support of medical transportation." 7 Through this inter-
pretation, these nations have implicitly acknowledged that encryption tech-
nology is so commonplace that it has become impractical to utilize aircraft
not so equipped for medical transport.1
1 8
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. The impetus for the additional protocols was the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross's belief that international law insufficiently covered cer-
tain areas of warfare in the conflicts following World War II, "specifically aerial bombard-
ments, protection of civilians, and wars of national liberation." OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 11. Although the United States has not ratified Protocol I, it
views many of its provisions as either customary international law or as accepted practice,
through not legally binding. Id. This includes the provisions on medical units, aircraft, and
ships. Id. For a detailed discussion of United States acceptance of and objections to provi-
sions contained in Protocol I, see Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the
Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419, 420-29 (1987).
116. Protocol I, supra note 115, art. 28(2). "Intelligence data" means "any information
which could have an effect on the conduct of military operations: for example, signalizing
the presence of military positions in a particular sector is clearly intelligence data, but so is
signalizing the absence of such positions." Commentaries to Protocol Additional to the Ge-
neva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 28(2), at 302, available at http://www.icrc.org/
ihl.nsf/WebComART?OpenView [hereinafter Commentaries to Protocol 1]. "Whether or not
it has collected or transmitted such data, an aircraft carrying equipment intended for [the
collection or transmission of intelligence data] is committing a breach." Id. at 303.
117. Ratification of the Additional Protocols by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, Jan. 28, 1998, para. e, reprinted in 322 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 186, 187
(1998).
Given the practical need to make use of non-dedicated aircraft for medical
evacuation purposes, the United Kingdom does not interpret this paragraph as
precluding the presence on board of communications equipment and encryption
materials or the use thereof solely to facilitate navigation, identification or com-
munication in support of medical transportation as defined in Article 8(f).
Id.; see also Ratification of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Au-
gust 1949 by Ireland, May 19, 1999, para. 4, reprinted in 834 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 418,
419 (1999) (same); Adh6sion de la France au Protocole I du 8 juin 1977, 11 avril 2001, para.
5, reprinted in 842 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 549 (2001) (En contexte "d'utiliser des avions...
pour... d'6vacuation sanitaire, le gouvernement... frangais[] n'interpr~te pas le paragraphe
2 de l'article 28 comme excluant ... [les] 6quipements de communication et ... de cryptolo-
gie, ni l'utilisation de ceux-ci uniquement [pour] faciliter la navigation, l'identification ou la
communication au profit d'une mission de transport sanitaire, comme d6finie A I'article 8.")
118. Although the trend is toward allowing equipment with cryptological functions, the
carrying of equipment permitting access to the SIPRNet would appear to violate this provi-
sion of Protocol I, because the SIPRNet as a whole is clearly designed to transmit intelli-
gence data. See Commentaries to Protocol I, supra note 116, at 303 ("Whether or not it has
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VII. "TRUST BUT VERIFY"
Encrypted communications represent an ever-increasing share of
communications in the military. We have seen that with the proliferation of
encryption technology, scholars have proposed that the prohibition on such
transmissions by medical ships covered under Geneva Convention II be
abolished. In such an environment, extending the prohibition on encrypted
transmissions to medical facilities covered under Geneva Convention I is
unwarranted. Given the present climate and status of the law, treaty
modifications are not required to permit the United States military's
operation of the TMIP from medical units covered under Geneva
Convention I. If, in fact, the United States espouses this interpretation, it
should, at a minimum, strongly consider a declaration to that effect. A
declaration would serve to place other nations on notice as to United States'
policy on encryption of medical facility data.
However, in the interest of fostering forthrightness under the law of
armed conflict, the United States should go one step farther: the authoriza-
tion of observers or inspectors to verify that the TMIP is only used for the
transmission of medical information. 19 Of course, practical considerations
prevent such persons from being present at every American military medi-
cal facility covered under Geneva Convention I. Nevertheless, inspectors at
the macro level of the TMIP could certainly verify that the system as a
whole only carries medical information. Such an inspection or observer
program, with appropriate safeguards for sensitive United States technology
and information, conducted perhaps by members of an international body
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, would mollify any
criticism by other states that that the United States was violating the spirit of
the Geneva Conventions through encrypted medical communications net-
collected or transmitted such data, an aircraft carrying equipment intended for [the collection
or transmission of intelligence data] is committing a breach."). One answer to this dilemma is
for the medical aircraft's equipment to have access only to that portion of the SIPRNet relat-
ing to the TMIP resides and no other. This data is not "intelligence data" as characterized in
the commentaries to Protocol I. See Commentaries to Protocol I, supra note 116, at 303;
supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text. Therefore, there would be no violation.
119. The SAN REMO MANUAL suggests placing observers on board medical ships to pre-
vent the misuse of cryptographic equipment. Roach, supra note 77, at 76 (citing Geneva
Convention II, art. 31(4)). Moreover, observers are not unprecedented in other activities,
such as the realm of arms control. See generally Barry Kellman, David S. Gualtieri, & Ed-
ward A. Tanzman, Disarmament and Disclosure: How Arms Control Verification Can Pro-
ceed Without Threatening Confidential Business Information, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 71 (1995).
Neither are observers unprecedented in the treatment of wounded, sick, and prisoners of war.
See Geneva Convention I, supra note 66, art. 3(2); Geneva Convention II, supra note 68, art.
3(2); OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 27 ("Subject to essential security needs
and other reasonable requirements, the ICRC must be permitted to visit [prisoners of war]
and provide them certain types of relief.").
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works. Such a step may also prevent a need to call for modifications to ap-
plicable treaties, a process sure to be fraught with numerous obstacles. The
United States has often invoked the adage "trust, but verify" in its dealing
with other nations and should expect other nations to apply that same apho-
rism to it with equal force. 120 International observers/inspectors would per-
mit parties to the Geneva Conventions to verify that the TMIP is in harmony
with those conventions and would raise the level of trust that other nations
exhibit towards the United States, surely a goal of American foreign policy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As encryption technology becomes an integral and seamless part of
electronic information exchange in every facet of military operations, the
application of such technology in military medical facilities raises issues
under LOAC. A careful look at the consequences of encrypting data from
medial facilities is necessary, as a violation of LOAC could subject such
facilities to attack.
Although Geneva Convention I does not restrict encryption of medical
data from land-based facilities, Geneva Convention II specifically restricts
encrypted communications from medical ships at sea. A textual analysis of
these documents does not lend to extending the restrictions of Geneva Con-
vention II to land-based medical facilities. This position is strengthened by
recent Western countries' use of encrypted communications from medical
aircraft. This position recognizes such encryption technology as an integral
part of operating these advanced aircraft, and indeed the operation of ad-
vanced medical facility information technologies.
Although encrypted communications from land- and air-based medical
facilities do not violate Geneva Convention I, as encryption becomes more
invasive, the United States military should take steps to ensure that use of
such technology does not unwittingly place these facilities at risk. One way
to assure their safety is to make a formal declaration of intent to use encryp-
tion and its limits on medical data at these facilities. Another method is to
employ neutral observers or inspectors to assure that the objectives of the
Geneva Conventions are not eroded by use of such encryption technology.
In this way, the United States may offer assurance to other nations that the
maxim "trust but verify" applies equally to all.
120. American President Ronald Reagan often invoked the Russian maxim "doveryai no
proveryai" ("trust but verify") in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. See The
Summit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1987, at A21 (transcribing remarks of President Reagan and
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev during signing of treaty pledging the removal of So-
viet and American medium and short range nuclear missiles from Europe).
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